We study a unique natural experiment, during which 5-10% of draft opinions by judges of the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA) were randomly selected for "quality review" by a team of full-time staff attorneys for nearly 15 years. This performance program had the express goals of measuring accuracy and reducing reversal rates on appeal. In cases of legal error, the quality review team wrote memoranda to judges to permit correction before opinions were issued. We use rich internal administrative data on nearly 600,000 cases from 2002-2016 to provide the first rigorous study of this review process. With precise estimates, we show that the program had no appreciable effect on reducing appeals or reversals. Based on internal records, we demonstrate that this inefficacy is likely by design, as meeting the performance measure of "accuracy" was at cross-purposes with error correction. These findings inform longstanding questions of law, organization, and bureaucracy, including performance management, standards of review, and the institutional design of mass adjudication.
Introduction
A hallmark feature of the American administrative state is mass adjudication. Each year, roughly 1,300 administrative law judges in the Social Security Administration (SSA) resolve over 600,000 disability and social security appeals, more than the caseload of all U.S. federal district courts combined. In the Executive Office for Immigration Review, roughly 250 immigration judges process over 270,000 cases, grappling with a backlog of nearly 700,000 cases. And in the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board), some 90 veterans law judges (VLJs) decide 50,000 cases, with over 1,000 cases docketed per VLJ, annually.
Decades of scholarship have pointed to severe challenges in the effectiveness, accuracy, and consistency of such mass administrative justice (see, e.g., Asimow, 2016; Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 1995; Ho, 2017; Mashaw et al., 1978; Mashaw, 1985a; Noonan et al., 2009; Ramji-Nogales et al., 2007) . In landmark studies, Mashaw et al. (1978) and Mashaw (1985a) documented dramatic disparities in how SSA administrative law judges adjudicated comparable cases. Mashaw argued these failures amounted to a constitutional due process problem, requiring an internal management systems for quality assurance and performance management (Mashaw, 1973 (Mashaw, , 1985a . Mashaw pointed to the VA's "statistical quality assurance control" system as one positive example (Mashaw, 1973, pp. 793-96) and famously argued that agencies could and should internally develop such mechanisms for bureaucratic rationality (Mashaw, 1985a) . The then-General Accounting Office (GAO), in turn, called for better management of administrative adjudication (US General Accounting Office, 1978; Lubbers, 1993) . The Administrative Conference of the United States similarly recommended using management techniques to address inter-judge disparities (Administrative Conference of the United States, 1978 ). Yet in spite of continuing challenges in mass adjudication Marcus, 2016, 2018; Hausman, 2016; Ho, 2017; Krent and Morris, 2013; Verkuil, 2017 Verkuil, , 1991 and much writing about law and management of the bureaucracy (e.g., Brodkin, 2006; Chassman and Rolston, 1979; Metzger, 2014; Simon, 1983 Simon, , 2006 Wilson, 1991) , there exists little rigorous evi-dence about the effectiveness of quality management systems in adjudication specifically or the public sector generally (Greiner and Matthews, 2016; Ho and Sherman, 2017; Margetts, 2011) . To date, the evidence exists exclusively of useful but limited qualitative case studies (e.g., Brodkin and Lipsky, 1983; Koch Jr and Koplow, 1990) , with no systematic evidence about the causal effect of quality assurance programs (Brennan, 1998; Cable, 2001; Simon, 2012) .
We study a unique randomized natural experiment that offers rich insight into this central question in bureaucracy, organization, and administrative law. For over 15 years, the BVA used a computer to randomly sample 5% of draft (original) decisions by judges, subjecting these decisions to a time-and resource-intensive quality review process by an independent team of full-time attorneys. For decisions remanded by the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC), which hears appeals from BVA decisions, the BVA randomly sampled 10% of decisions. Attorneys analyzed draft opinions, identified legal errors, and wrote memoranda to VLJs to enable judges to correct opinions before issued. Roughly 75% of decisions appealed to CAVC result in a remand of at least one issue, and the program was expressly designed with the dual goals of (a) reducing the remand / reversal rate of BVA decisions from CAVC and (b) measuring the accuracy of BVA decisions.
We secure internal administrative data on nearly 600,000 cases from 2003-2016, never before used by outside researchers, to provide the first rigorous study of the effects of this internal management system. First, we show that we are able to replicate the random case selection process for quality review with high fidelity. Our ability to replicate the randomization process stems largely from the fact that we are using the same, rich internal dataset that BVA used to carry out this process. At the same time, we also rely on public records and information act requests to ensure that we are replicating the process exactly, as the GAO documented imperfections in the randomization scheme in early years (US General Accounting Office, 2002) . 1 The administrative data contains rich covariate information, and we show balance on over 80 dimensions, including legal representation, timing, number of legal issues, age and gender of appellant, service period, issue type, medical diagnostic codes, and disposition. The randomization hence provides a credible research design to compare "treatment" decisions subjected to the quality review with "control" decisions.
We study whether the program had effects on the probability that claimants appeal to the CAVC and the probability that CAVC reversed or remanded (conditional on appeal). We find that both for original and CAVC-remanded decisions, there is no appreciable benefit of quality review.
Cases that underwent quality review have indistinguishable appeal, reversal, and remand rates from cases that did not. We then study whether the program affected inter-judge variability. We test and find no evidence for heterogeneous VLJ-specific treatment effects.
We then investigate the mechanism for the lack of effectiveness. We rule out that VLJs simply ignored memoranda written by the quality review team. Our evidence also does not support the possibility that the results are explained by arbitrariness of CAVC decisions or the quality review team. To the contrary, we show that conditional on quality review, the presence of an error is associated with a higher risk of a remand. This shows that the quality review team was in fact able to identify low-quality types of opinions. But even for opinions that the quality review deemed to have no errors, the remand rate remained a stunning 74%. As a result, the limited corrections had no substantive effect on how a case, which typically presents numerous issues, fared on appeal.
This evidence also points to the best explanation for the program's ineffectiveness: divergence between CAVC's and BVA's standard of review. Formally, the standards were announced as the same: BVA should identify issues which would "result in the reversal or remand of a Board decision by [CAVC] ." Yet internal documents reveal that the review team in fact deployed a significantly more lenient standard. Errors were identified only when there were no "legitimate differences of opinion." The internal training manual later clarified that an error should only be called when "undebatable." We demonstrate this divergence empirically by comparing the rate at which the quality review team called errors with CAVC's remand rate for the same error in the same cases.
For the most common error, namely the failure to adequately explain a decision, we find CAVC remands at six times the rate that quality review calls the error. We also show that more stringent quality reviewers are more likely to agree with CAVC's disposition in a case.
The likely reason for this functional divergence of standards of review was the desire to meet BVA's performance goal of "accurate" decisions. BVA would regularly report accuracy rates of 93-95% in its Annual Reports (e.g., Board of Veterans ' Appeals, 2014 ' Appeals, , 2016 , which were defined as a key performance measure under the Government Performance and Results Act and scrutinized in congressional oversight hearings (House Committee on Veterans ' Affairs, 2007 ' Affairs, , 2008 Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, 2005). The divergence hence illustrates the potential conflict when an agency can define its own performance measure under conflicting objectives.
Our setting has several virtues. First, methodologically, our study is the first to leverage randomization and large-scale administrative data to provide credible inferences about the causal effect of a quality review program in the administrative state. The internal data, used by BVA to run the quality review program, allows us to cleanly replicate the randomization scheme. Due to the sheer scale of the program, our estimates are also quite precise, allowing us to rule effects of any substantial magnitude. Second, the BVA quality review program exemplifies the kind of program scholars and policymakers have envisioned as curing the due process problems of mass adjudication (Administrative Conference of the United States, 1978; US Government Accountability Office, 2005; Gelbach and Marcus, 2016; Mashaw, 1973) . The review process was resource-intensive, involving four to six full-time staff attorneys, with the case load of the team exceeding that of most U.S. district courts. By leveraging the insight of peers, our natural experiment is also related to the idea of Mashaw et al. (1978) , which used simulation to calculate reversal rates if appeals were decided by panels, and Ho (2017) , which found evidence in a randomized controlled trial that peer review reduced the inter-inspector citation rate. Last, the BVA context allows us to focus on a fairly well-defined, if complex, area of law. Approximately 95% of appeals pertain to disability issues. This substantive focus means that the quality review team would seem well-positioned to identify systematic errors in VLJ decision making. And while many have pointed to the parallels between the SSA, immigration courts, and the BVA (e.g., Asimow, 2016; Gelbach and Marcus, 2018; Congressional Research Service, 2012; Sabel and Simon, 2017; Verkuil, 2017 Verkuil, , 1991 , few studies have empirically examined decision making in veterans adjudication. 2 Our paper also informs several other strands of scholarly literature. First, our findings illustrate the difficulty of performance measurement in the public sector when a principal's objective may not be contractible and when there are heterogeneous objectives (Baker, 1992; Barnow, 2000; Bevan and Hood, 2006; Dixit, 2002; Duflo et al., 2013; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) . Our findings underscore the difficulty of monitoring bureaucratic and judicial quality, which is central to questions of presidential and congressional oversight of agencies (Boyd and Driscoll, 2013; Cuéllar, 2006; McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984) , and can be conceived of as an example of supervisor-agent collusion (gaming performance targets) in the agency framework of Tirole (1986) . Second, scholars have long debated whether an appeals process can serve as a form of "error correction" (Shavell, 1995) , with administrative law scholars expressing more skepticism in the mass adjudicatory context, particularly given non-random selection of appeals (see Hausman, 2016; Mashaw, 1980; Simon, 2015; but cf. Gelbach and Marcus, 2018) . Our paper shows limitations to the ability to reduce reversal rates even with random selection of judicial decisions. Third, our study also provides evidence of the causal effect of standards of review, a core topic of administrative law (see, e.g., Breyer et al., 2011) .
Our setting enables us to examine how the same set of cases fared under two divergent standards of review. This helps overcome conventional selection challenges in observational studies of the impact of standards of review (e.g., Miles and Sunstein, 2006; Schuck and Elliott, 1990) . Last, these findings address the question of whether institutions can be reformed from within (Banerjee et al., 2012) , particularly in the development of an "internal administrative law," a topic of increasing scholarly focus (Metzger and Stack, 2016; Parrillo, 2017; Sabel and Simon, 2017) . Our evidence is consistent with Blanes i Vidal and Leaver (2015) , who find that favoritism bias leads judges to reverse peers less frequently when reviewing the quality of judicial decisions. Such potential for favoritism and conflicts may be a substantial challenge to developing quality review -and administrative law -from within an agency.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background to veterans adjudication and the quality review process. Section 3 describes our unique BVA dataset and demonstrates that we are able to replicate the randomized case selection process for quality review. Section 4 presents results and Section 5 presents limitations. Section 6 concludes with implications. Roughly 6% of BVA decisions are appealed to CAVC, which reviews findings of fact under a "clearly erroneous" standard and findings of non-factual issues under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard (38 U.S.C. § 7261). CAVC remands BVA decisions frequently (Ridgway, 2009) . Roughly 76% of all cases appealed to the CAVC result in a remand (on at least one issue) to the BVA. In 14% of CAVC-remanded cases, the resulting BVA decision is again appealed to CAVC. CAVC decisions may also be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and then the U.S.
Institutional Background
Supreme Court, but such appeals are exceedingly rare.
The creation of CAVC and its high remand rate led BVA to develop a more systematic quality review (QR) program. Describing the initiative in 1998, the BVA Chairman wrote:
Quality in appellate decision-making is one of several ways to measure how well the Board is fulfilling its statutory mission . . . It is also the Board's single most important goal in fulfilling that mission because timely delivery of appellate decisions is meaningless if the underlying adjudication is fundamentally flawed. 3
While the program was revised in the early years, in part due to criticism by the GAO (US General Accounting Office, 2002), it remained essentially unchanged from November 1, 2002 to November 15, 2016. The program randomly selected 5% of "original" appeals (i.e., those not on remand from the CAVC) and 10% of appeals on remand from the CAVC. Random selection was made by computer after an opinion was drafted by a VLJ, but before the opinion was issued, so as to enable VLJs to make corrections. The Office of Quality Review, comprised of four to six attorneys, reviewed draft opinions for specific errors. The QR team determined whether the opinion (a) addressed all relevant issues, (b) accounted for all evidence, (c) addressed relevant laws and regulations, (d) provided a clear explanation of the "reasons and bases" for the decision, (e) addressed due process, and (f) was properly formatted (e.g., spelling, grammar, structure). Each QR team member coded these categories along with a more exhaustive subcategory coding. 4 Formally, the QR team's standard of review was equated with CAVC's: the QR team should "call" a substantive error (i.e., errors excluding formatting errors) when the opinion exhibited "a deficiency that would be outcome determinative, that is, result in the reversal or remand of a Board decision by [CAVC]" (Board of Veterans ' Appeals, 2002, p. 7) . In instances of legal error, the QR team would draft a memorandum to be circulated to the VLJ. VLJs were then given the chance to revise the opinion before it issued. When a VLJ disagreed with the memorandum, the VLJ was permitted to make an informal challenge to the BVA's Chief Counsel for Policy and Procedure. In practice, VLJs typically revised opinions and made very few challenges to QR memoranda. In addition to these memoranda, the QR team conducted training to address common errors and circulated monthly reports on changes in the law, quality concerns, and errors identified.
One of BVA's strategic performance goals was "to make deficiency-free decisions 95 percent of the time" (US General Accounting Office, 2002). 5 VLJs are subject to regular performance reviews (38 U.S.C. § 7101A). While the Board described the goal of the QR data "to measure performance in the area of quality for the Board as a whole," it also potentially permitted its use in performance reviews. 6
Descriptive Statistics and Balance
Data. We secure data, never before analyzed by outside researchers, on all BVA decisions from October 1, 1999, to January 31, 2018. Originally designed to physically locate files, the scope of the "Veterans Appeals Control and Locator System" (VACOLS) was expanded over time to manage, track, and measure all relevant dimensions of BVA appeals. For each case, we obtain a rich set of variables, including the BVA disposition (e.g., whether relief was granted) on each issue, prior procedural history (e.g., hearing information), appellant information (e.g., age, gender, service period), issues disputed (e.g., whether the disability had a service connection), diagnostic categories for each issue (e.g., musculoskeletal disease), whether the case was selected for QR, and all error codes the QR team identified for that case, whether the case was appealed to CAVC, CAVC's disposition on each issue (e.g., affirmed, remanded), and BVA's coding of the reason for a CAVC remand. We clean and restructure the database, resulting in 2,727,418 appeals, 6,157,531 unique issues, 459,628 hearings, and 39,528 appeals selected for quality review.
QR-Eligible Cases. In order to identify the causal effect of QR on a case, we need to be able to replicate the 5% selection rule for original decisions and the 10% selection rule for CAVCremanded opinions. We use public reports, internal records secure through FOIA, and institutional knowledge to exclude cases ineligible for QR. First, we exclude decisions that were "supplemental actions" (actions taken after the Board entered a decision), reconsiderations of final decisions, and procedural actions (e.g., designations of records for appeal to CAVC). Second, we exclude any decision subsequently made by the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) upon remand by the Board. Third, we exclude dismissals due to the death of the appellant. After these exclusions, we are left with 785,812 QR-eligible decisions, comprising about 29% of all VACOLS appeals.
The left panel of Figure 1 plots the volume of original appeals and CAVC-remanded appeals over time. As caseload has been increasing over time, the number of original appeals has been rising over time, with an average of roughly 11,500 per quarter in 2016. CAVC remands have similarly been rising over time, with an average of about 1,500 remands per quarter in 2016.
Observation Window. While the modern QR program was created in 1998, it was subject to revision and critiqued in an influential GAO Report in 2002 (US General Accounting Office, 2002).
Specifically, GAO pointed out that the early implementation of the program was beset by sampling irregularities. We continue to observe evidence of such irregularities until August 2003, so we limit our observation window to cases eligible for QR from August 1, 2003 to November 9, 2016, the last date appeals were selected for the same QR program. On November 15, 2016, the program was substantially revised to terminate random sampling of cases for QR.
To check our replication of the QR selection process, we calculate selection rates for original and CAVC-remanded cases, which should be around 5% and 10%, respectively. This calculation requires recreating the precise timing for QR selection, as an appeal was QR-eligible after the decision was signed but before the decision was dispatched to the appellant. Although we observe the dispatch date, we do not observe the signature date. As a proxy for this date, we used the date that the decision attachment was uploaded to the system, which was conducted in the vast majority of cases by an administrator after signature but before the dispatch of the decision. 7
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Figure 2: Quantile-quantile plot of t-statistics from 80 balance tests between appeals selected and not selected for QR against reference t n1+n2−2 -distribution. Cases are split by original and CAVC-remanded cases. pvalues are from a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of distribution equality between the observed t-statistics and reference distribution.
we calculate a 5.01% selection rate, and for 47,981 CAVC-remanded appeals, we calculate a 10.49% selection rate. Although the right panel shows that there is some variability in the quarter-byquarter selection rate -driven by idiosyncratic factors such as the fiscal year, staffing, and turnover -the rates suggest we have replicated BVA's selection scheme.
Balance. Random selection should ensure that QR cases are comparable on all observable dimensions to non-QR (or control) cases. We verify this by checking balance on a wide range of preselection (or pretreatment) covariates. Table 1 displays the difference between QR and control cases for selected covariates, along with t-tests for statistical significance. All differences are small in absolute magnitude and not statistically significant. For instance, 49% of QR cases involve Vietnam War veterans, compared to 49% of control cases. The average age of the veteran is 55.6 for QR cases and 55.7 for control cases. Because the covariate set is so rich, Figure 2 summarizes balance with a quantile-quantile plot of t-statistics of all 80 covariates against a reference t-distribution. As expected, these test statistics line up on the 45 • line. We test for distributional equivalence between the observed and reference distributions (using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test), yielding p-values of 1 and 0.3 for original and CAVC-remanded appeals. Across all salient dimensions -BVA appeals history, prior hearings, issue types, and a rich set of diagnostic codes -there are no substantively or statistically significant differences between QR and control cases. Our understanding of the QR process, the ability to replicate the selection rates, and the wide range of balance checks on the same internal data used to admininister the system gives us confidence that we have replicated the QR selection process. Random selection with such a large sample ensures balance across and QR and control, enabling us to assess the impact of QR on case outcomes.
Results

Causal Effect of Quality Review
We now test whether the QR performance program met its stated goal of reducing the number of remands / reversals at CAVC. Because of the divergent QR selection schemes for original and CAVC-remanded cases, we conduct separate analyses for each case type. First, we examine the effect on whether the BVA decision was subsequently appealed to CAVC. If the QR process reduced the number of legal errors by correcting draft decisions, we should expect claimants to be less likely to appeal the decision. The top row in the first panel of Table 2 shows that there is no appreciable reduction in the appeals rate: the rate remains at 6%, regardless of whether the case was subject to the QR process. Outcomes are all actions taken after dispatch of the BVA decision. "Appealed to CAVC" represents the proportion of cases appealed to CAVC. Because each appeal can involve multiple issues, "case outcome" presents the average number of cases with at least one issue subject to each disposition. p-values are adjusted for multiple tests using Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) . For readability, we exclude disposition codes with very low case counts (i.e., vacated and dismissed, settled, and dismissed due to death), which also have no statistically significant differences between QR and control cases.
to 75% of reviewed appeals (95% CI for difference: [-2.97%, 1.82%]).
We conduct the same analyses for CAVC-remanded cases in the right panel of Table 2 . As it may be procedurally confusing, it is worth remembering the temporal sequence of cases in the right panel of Table 2 : CAVC earlier issued a remand and the cases comprise BVA decisions responding to that remand. That BVA decision may be selected for QR (at a 10% rate) and then potentially be appealed to CAVC again, which forms one outcome of interest.
The appeals rate for CAVC-remanded appeals was 14% for non-QR appeals and 13% for QR appeals. This 1% difference is not statistically significant, although the 95% confidence interval of We then add fixed effects each unique year-quarter (second column) and for each VLJ. Effects for original cases remain statistically insignificant for both the appeal rate (top left) and the remand rate (bottom left). The right columns present comparable fixed effects models for CAVC-remanded cases. While the QR effect CAVC disposition (conditional on appeal) is again statistically insignificant, we observe statistically significant estimates of the QR program on the probability of appeals, corresponding to a 1% reduction in the appeals rate. The magnitude, however, remains small.
With 5,622 CAVC-remanded cases undergoing QR, the best estimate is that the QR process avoids roughly 60 appeals. To put that in context, the Board received over 90,000 cases in 2017 alone.
Staffing a QR office with four to six full-time attorneys to avoid 60 appeals, when a single VLJ has 1,000 cases docketed annually, illustrates that this effect is substantively not very meaningful. 10
In order to isolate the effect of the memoranda drafted by the QR team, we also estimate a series 9 We note that such adjustment is not uncontested (see, e.g., Freedman, 2008) . 10 Appendix E also shows that the effect on appeals for CAVC-remanded cases vanishes when focusing on denials, which are the large majority of cases appealed to CAVC. Table 4 : Instrumental variable linear models for the effect of an "exception memorandum" on outcomes, using random selection for QR as an instrument. The "memorandum effect" is the causal effect of an "exception memorandum" on the subset of cases that received such a memorandum because of the QR process, and the row presents coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * * * p < 0.001, * * p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
Original CAVC-Remanded
of instrumental variables models. The QR effect models above can be conceived of as recovering "intention to treat" effects, when the treatment of interest may be the memorandum written by the QR team (Angrist et al., 1996) . Randomized QR selection can then be used as the instrument for whether a memorandum was written to the VLJ, which occurred for all substantive errors. Because the memoranda formed the principal mode of communication between the QR team and VLJs, and because no communication occurred when no errors were called, the exclusion restriction -that QR selection affected outcomes exclusively through memoranda -is plausible. Table 4 presents results. Again, the results other than the memorandum effect for CAVC-remanded cases on the probability of an appeal are statistically insignificant. There is hence little evidence of a stronger effect in the subset of cases receiving memoranda. 11
We now examine whether the effects of quality review are heterogeneous across VLJs. One of the recurrent criticisms of BVA adjudication is the lack of "consistency" across judges ( disparities (Ho, 2017) . If a "tough" judge interprets the "duty to assist" claimants too narrowly, for instance, feedback from QR might increase claimant-favorable dispositions by that judge. If a judge with high allowance rates misinterprets a CAVC precedent about a certain disease category, the QR program might reduce that judge's allowance rates.
To test for such heterogeneous treatment effects, we first conduct VLJ-specific balance checks.
In Appendix B, we report rejection rates of covariate balance tests for each VLJ. As expected, we find that chance imbalance is much higher with VLJs who have decided fewer opinions. Similarly, we find that the QR selection rate stablizes only for VLJs with higher numbers of opinions. We hence focus our inquiry on 57 VLJs with at least 4,000 control opinions available. While this might seem like a high threshold, the expected number of opinions that would both go through QR and be appealed to CAVC under the null would be less than 12 (= 4000 cases × 5% QR selection rate × 6% appeal rate). Given small cell counts, we hence use Fisher's exact test for whether the odds ratio of an appeal (or CAVC remand) is higher for QR cases specific to each judge. As a measure of stringency, we calculate the baseline relief rate for each VLJ. 12 We omit results on CAVC-remanded decisions, as VLJ-specific effects are too imprecise. program affected VLJs at the extremes of the allowance rate range, we should observe statistically significant treatment effects at the low and high end of allowance rates. Most effects, however, are centered around the origin, and there is no detectable correlation of effects with the allowance rate. In fact, we reject the null hypothesis for 8% of VLJs, which is close to expected under the null at α = 0.05. (A correction for multiple testing using Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) yields no statistically significant VLJ effects at α = 0.05.) In short, there is little evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects that would reduce the inter-VLJ disparities.
Mechanism
Why is the program so ineffective? One potential explanation is that CAVC outcomes are We test this hypothesis by focusing on the subset of cases that underwent QR and comparing cases for which a substantive error was flagged with cases for which no error was flagged. If CAVC outcomes are indeed unpredictable, there should be no association between QR-detected errors and CAVC outcomes. Table 5 , however, shows that this is not the case. The top row shows that BVA decisions with flagged errors (excluding formatting errors) had higher rates of appeal for both original and CAVC-remanded appeals. The QR team, attorneys, and claimants appear capable of distinguishing higher and lower quality decisions. Conditional on an appeal to the CAVC, original appeals with any error were 12% more likely to have at least one issue vacated and remanded (p < 0.01). In contrast, there was no statistically significant difference in the remand rates conditional on appeal for CAVC-remanded cases (p = 0.48). In short, while CAVC judges may differ in propensities, the lack of effectiveness of the QR process cannot be explained sheer randomness of case outcomes at CAVC. Outcomes are all actions taken after dispatch of the BVA decision. "Appealed to CAVC" represents the proportion of cases appealed to CAVC. Because each appeal can involve multiple issues, "case outcome" presents the average number of cases with at least one issue subject to each disposition. p-values are adjusted for multiple tests using Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) . For readability, we exclude disposition codes with very low case counts (i.e., vacated and dismissed, settled, and dismissed due to death), which also have no statistically significant differences between QR and control cases.
Another potential explanation is that VLJs might simply ignore memoranda written by the QR team, making no revisions to correct legal errors documented in draft decisions. This hypothesis requires one to believe that the principal work output by a full-time team of four to six staff attorneys is being ignored by VLJs. There are several reasons to doubt this. First, memoranda were routed to VLJs through supervisors, providing an incentive for VLJs to respond. Second, one of the common complaints by staff attorneys and VLJs is about the lack of time to conduct extensive legal research on all cases, given the caseload expectations at the BVA. An individualized memorandum offering advice and legal research on how to correct errors would appear to be a welcome method of improving opinions. Third, while we do not have direct evidence of revisions made to draft opinions, through interviews with former BVA officials and institutional knowledge gained from one of the coauthors as former-Chief of the BVA's Office of Quality Assurance, our understanding is that VLJs commonly incorporated decision-specific feedback from the QR process.
Last, while some VLJs may have paid less attention to QR memoranda, we do not detect statistically significant effects for nearly all VLJs, suggesting something more general is transpiring.
Based on internal documents describing the QR program over time, the results of Table 5 offer a more compelling explanation: the standard of review. Notwithstanding the fact that the internal standard of review was formally equated with that of CAVC, internal documents show that the QR process in fact gave significantly more deference to VLJ determinations. In a Chairman's Memorandum, the QR was to ignore instances with "legitimate differences of opinion." In updating QR instructions in 2017, the Board became even clearer in its QR training manual, stating that an error must be "undebatable" to be flagged. The net effect was that while some errors were corrected through the QR process, they were nowhere close to the stringency required to withstand scrutiny on appeal. Most stunningly, Table 5 shows that for cases given a clean bill of health (i.e., with no errors identified) by the QR team, CAVC remanded 74% of the time when appealed.
To corroborate this explanation, the first column of Table 6 reports the proportion of times that specific error categories are called by the QR team. Across the board, these call rates appear low:
the QR team called an error for failure to explain the "reason or basis" of an opinion (veteran's law jargon for administrative law's demand for a reasoned explanation) in under 5% of QR cases.
The second column reports error call rates for the sample of QR cases that were also appealed to CAVC. The error citation rates are slightly higher, as would be expected if the QR team is able to identify lower quality cases. To compare this to the CAVC standard of review, we leverage the fact that BVA's own data code whether the reason for a CAVC remand was due process or "reasons or bases." 13 The right column calculates these remand rates for the same set of cases that both went through QR and were appealed. The column shows that CAVC remand rates are substantially higher than BVA's error rates. CAVC remands on due process grounds in 10% of appeals, an issue flagged only 4% of the time by the QR team in the same cases. Most dramatic is that CAVC remands 62% of appeals for inadequate "reasons or bases," but BVA's QR team flags these errors only 10% of the time. These data provide strong evidence that the QR process does not review cases as stringently as CAVC.
We can also probe this explanation by examining variation between the QR team members.
In general, QR cases were assigned to each reviewer in the chronological order that they were drawn. 14 This allows us to measure the stringency of each reviewer by calculating the rate at which each reviewer calls errors. We find substantial variability across reviewers, with one reviewer calling errors for 17% of all cases and three reviewers calling errors in under 3% of cases. We hence test whether this internal variation in stringency is associated with agreement with CAVC on the sample of QR cases that were also appealed. We measure agreement by correspondence between (a) whether CAVC reversed or remanded, and (b) whether the reviewer called an error. Figure 4 plots reviewer stringency on the x-axis against the agreement rate on the y-axis. Each dot represents one of 41 reviewers, weighted by the number of QR cases processed. We indeed observe that more stringent reviewers are more likely to agree with CAVC's disposition. Based on a least squares fit, a 10% increase in the error call rate is associated with a 25% increase, plus or minus 10% at a 95% level, in the CAVC agreement rate. This variation suggests that increasing stringency would align BVA's internal standard of review with that of CAVC.
It is worth noting that appeals selection does not explain the discrepancy between BVA's claim
13 Appendix D provides detail on the coding of remand reasons. While specific codes have changed over time, these can be largely mapped to broader categories of due process and reasons or bases.
14 For extremely complicated cases, the chief of the QR office would ensure balance of workloads across reviewers. Error call rate CAVC agreement rate Figure 4 : Correlation between stringency of each QR reviewer (i.e., the error call rate) on the x-axis and the agreement with CAVC on the y-axis. Reviewers with higher error call rates are more likely to agree with CAVC, conditional on a case being appealed.
of a high accuracy rate and CAVC's high remand rate. To the contrary, we have direct evidence that appeals do not perfectly sort erroneous and non-erroneous cases. The QR team calls errors in 6.5% of cases that are not appealed, compared to a baseline of 6.9% across all cases. In other words, even with a lenient standard of review, unappealed cases appear to have significant errors.
What explains BVA's weakening of the internal standard of review? Recall that the QR program had dual purposes, namely (1) to reduce errors, and (2) to report a performance measure pursuant to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). Under the GPRA, BVA published its accuracy rate as the principal performance measure to support its annual budget requests.
With performance targets, weakening the standard of review internally may have been the easiest method of generating the appearance of effectiveness. The best evidence of this dynamic comes a memorandum by Vice Chairman Steven Keller in 2010. The VA's own Office of General Counsel (OGC) had sharply questioned the BVA's reported accuracy rate of 94%. OGC noted that in 2009, CAVC alone had reversed or remanded a higher absolute number of cases than would be mechanistically possible under a mere 6% "error rate." Vice Chairman Keller responded by stating that CAVC reversal or remand did not necessarily mean that the BVA decisions contained error. Keller argued that a remand for failure to provide an adequate explanation -textbook administrative law -should not be counted as error because the standard is "highly subjective and inconsistently applied." 15 Discounting the one error that is the predominant reason for CAVC remands is effectively an admission of decoupling BVA's standard of review from CAVC's.
Limitations
We now discuss limitations of our study. First, while our study has, for the first time, identified the causal effect of QR review on case outcomes, our research design does not provide leverage over the impact of the QR program as a whole. It is theoretically possible that the QR program had no effect on individual cases, but affected quality overall. For instance, if the QR team identified systematic errors and developed a training program for all VLJs, the benefit might manifest itself in all cases. There are reasons to doubt this account, however. The accuracy rate not in fact been uniformly increasing over time. And the fact that memoranda written specifically for draft decisions did not have an impact does not bode well for the effectiveness of training derived from those memoranda. Indeed it was the perceived inefficacy of the QR program, based on an internal (non-public) report, that led BVA to revise its QR system in 2016 to shift on more systematic, rather than individualized, detection of errors.
Second, while our finding of the effect of QR is a well-identified estimate of the average causal effect on the population of BVA cases, the causal inference about the effect of the standard of review is an in-sample effect. We only observe the same standard of review being applied to a (nonrandom) subset of BVA decisions that are appealed, which may magnify the difference. On the other hand, BVA decisions may have been partially corrected in response to the QR team memoranda, therefore muting the difference. Nonetheless, the fact that three quarters of BVA opinions, which are deemed error-free under BVA's standard of review, are remanded by BVA shows that the standard of review matters for a subset of cases.
Third, while many scholars have viewed immigration courts, social security adjudication, and the BVA as close institutional cousins (Asimow, 2016; Gelbach and Marcus, 2018; Congressional Research Service, 2012; Sabel and Simon, 2017; Verkuil, 2017 Verkuil, , 1991 , our evidence may have limited external validity for other quality improvement programs. SSA's programs, for instance, have rapidly evolved, making much greater use of technology (Ray and Lubbers, 2014) . The peer review program for immigration courts appeared to be much more of a training program. We believe the political and institutional tension in performance measurement, however, is likely common to many of these systems. Most importantly, without opening the black box of the agency, it is simply not possible to know. As Merrill (2017, p. 59) notes, whether the "internal law of administration . . . work [s] well in administrative schemes" is "a serious objection and can be answered only by undertaking further empirical investigations." Many surface descriptions of QR programs may appear compelling. Indeed, none other than Mashaw pointed to the VA's system of statistical quality assurance as an exemplar for internal management (Mashaw, 1973) . Moreover, our findings speak directly to current efforts at the BVA. In 2017, as part of a push for a renewed focus on reducing the backlog, BVA abandoned its 2016 reforms, returning to the system we studied here, but reducing the sampling rate and QR staff. The fact that a more intensive review process yielded few benefits suggest that the prospective reform is unlikely to address the longstanding quality problems in BVA adjudication.
Conclusion
Our study is the first to leverage randomization of quality review to credibly assess its effects on case outcomes, and contributes to central questions of administrative justice. We conclude with several implications.
First, the divergence in the BVA and CAVC standards of review highlight the tenuous role of judicial review in mass adjudicatory systems. The Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988 imported a model of adversarialism that posed a tension with VA's historical model of paternalistic charity (Ridgway, 2010 ). BVA's internal rejection of CAVC's demand for reasoned explanation -notwith-standing a 75% remand rate when no errors are called -illustrates the continuing internal conflict around these models. Procedure, after all, adds delay. As Justice Black noted in his dissent in Goldberg v. Kelly, procedures meant to protect claimants from termination of benefits can just as well delay eligibility. 16 It now takes an average of 6 years from filing a notice of disagreement to Board resolution (VA Office of Inspector General, 2018). The VA's Inspector General estimated that 7% of appeals were counted as "resolved" because the veteran died while waiting for a decision (id.). These facts raise basic questions of whether judicialization of mass adjudication in fact serves the veteran population (Mashaw, 1985b) .
Second, if judicial review won't solve these problems, our results also paint a sobering picture about the ability for an agency to internally develop such quality assurance initiatives. The degradation of BVA's quality review challenges more optimistic accounts of bureaucratic rationality Mashaw (1985a) and internal administrative law (Metzger and Stack, 2016) . Many have suggested random audits as the cure for mismanagement (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Cuéllar, 2006 ), but our evidence shows that random audits may be insufficient when agency supervisors have the discre- Third, our results suggest that case-specific quality review cannot remedy structural challenges stemming from the volume of cases. Errors stemming from caseload cannot easily be addressed by adding to caseload. BVA's efforts in 2016 to reform the QR program to focus less on case-specific review, but feedback at the systemic level, may be more promising (Ho, 2017; Gelbach and Marcus, 2018) . Fourth, our findings illustrate the difficulty of performance measurement in the public sector (Dixit, 2002) , popularized by David and Gaebler (1993) that inspired the GPRA. The inflated accuracy rate can be conceived of as a form of supervisor-agent collusion (Tirole, 1986) or as an example of biased peer review given the connections between QR staff attorneys and VLJs (Blanes i Vidal and Leaver, 2015) . Similar strategizing around performance measures in labor training programs led Barnow (2000) to find only weak evidence of a correlation between performance measures and program impact based on randomized controlled trials. Our evidence demonstrates that performance measurement is not just uncorrelated with, but can actually undermine, program impact.
Most generally, the changing standard for accuracy exemplifies the "quantity-quality" tradeoff that is the subject of much public administration scholarship (e.g., Bevan and Hood, 2006) . While accuracy was for years the first performance measure featured in budget requests and continues to be reported in the Board's annual reports, accuracy rates were removed from BVA's budget request starting in 2010. In 2017, one hundred VLJs and staff attorneys signed a loss of confidence statement, sent to House and Senate Veterans Affairs committees. The statement argued that the production quota, mismanagement, and inadequate training would effectively render the Board's de novo standard -meant to "ensure[] accuracy" -"meaningless." In contrast to the Acting Chairman's 1998 declaration that quality was BVA's "single most important goal," the agency's own performance measures now reflect a fixation on that which is easily measured: caseload.
A Additional Balance Statistics
Because of space constraints, Table 2 Table 7 : Additional balance checks on selected covariates between appeals not selected for quality review (Ctrl) and appeals randomly selected for quality review (QR) between August 1, 2003 and November 9, 2016. Appeals are split by whether they had been remanded by CAVC leading to the decision at issue. p-values are adjusted for multiple testing using Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) .
B VLJ-Specific Balance
To assess VLJ-specific treatment effects, we present balance diagnostics at the VLJ level. The left panel plots number of control opinions by a VLJ on the x-axis against the QR selection rate for that VLJ on the y-axis for original decisions. As expected, the selection rate is centered around 5%, with VLJs with fewer opinions exhibiting higher sampling variability. We also discovered through this balance check that there was a cluster of individuals whose cases had unexpectedly low selection rates, as indicated by the red cluster in the lower left corner of the left panel. These individuals are all part of the senior management team (e.g., Chairman of the Board or Chief Counsel for Policy and Procedure). Upon verifying with staff, it appears that these senior managers were excluded from having their cases undergo QR because of the potential conflict. We hence exclude these individuals from our QR-eligible cases. The right panel of Figure 5 plots the number of control opinions by a VLJ on the x-axis against the rejection rate of balance across 80 covariates on the y-axis. As expected, chance imbalances are much higher for VLJs with fewer opinions. We hence use a cutoff of 4,000 cases to estimate VLJ-specific treatment effects in Section 4.1.
C QR Coding of Case Errors
For reference, this appendix presents a more fine-grained error coding used by BVA's QR team. Table 6 presented error rates at the highest level of aggregation (e.g., reasons and bases). BVA used one set of QR error codes from 1999-2015, presented in Table 8 , and another set of QR error codes from 2015-2017, presented in Table 9 .
Error Description (1999 Description ( -2015 Original 
D CAVC Remand Reasons
This Appendix presents the BVA's coding of remands from CAVC. While BVA carried out more fine-grained issue codes, because these were switched in 2013, we present each of the subcodes only to clarify how we aggregated the available remand reasons into (a) due process or (b) reasons and bases for the analysis in Table 6 
E Robustness
Denials. Because the Board reviews all issues, but CAVC largely reviews denials, we subset our QR-eligible sample of cases to those with at least one denial and re-run the models in Table 12 . We find that the QR effect on both outcomes for original cases remains null, and the QR effect on appeals attenuates for CAVC-remanded cases to statistical insignificance. This suggests that the pooled effect on appeals for CAVC-remanded cases in Table 3 is being driven by QR review of decisions with allowances. This might be plausible if in the first CAVC decision, CAVC remanded on a denial for reconsideration, the initial VLJ decision provided an insufficient explanation for a continued denial, and the QR process converted such a denial into an allowance. There are, however, reasons to doubt whether this is a meaningful effect, largely because the QR process tends to focus on denials, as those are the likely cases to be appealed to CAVC. Table 12 : Robustness check including only cases with at least one issue denied. Logistic regression results of the probability of an appeal to CAVC (top panel) and the probability of a reversal or remand by CAVC, conditional on an appeal (bottom panel) for original cases (left columns) and CAVC-remanded cases (right column). The QR effect row presents the coefficient on the treatment indicator, with standard errors in parentheses. FEs indicate fixed effects, which are not displayed for readability; N indicates sample size. * * * p < 0.001, * * p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
